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We build a stylised 12-country model of the euro area and use it to analyse why
differences in national inflation and growth rates arise within the European
monetary union. We find that inflation persistence is a key potential explanatory
factor. Other more frequently mentioned reasons, like country-specific shocks
or differences in the monetary transmission mechanism across countries, count
less. We also look at how a monetary policy geared to area-wide average
inflation affects these differentials. Our model suggests that area-wide inflation
stability and low inflation differentials are complementary.
JEL classification: E31, E32, E52, F42
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September 2004Non-technical summary
Five years after the launch of the euro, the inflation differences among euro area
countries are still prominent in European economic debates. After converging sharply
in the 1990s, national inflation rates started to diverge again around 1999. Although
recently the differentials have closed somewhat, stylised facts show that inflation
differentials are larger and more persistent than, for example, in the United States.
In this paper we build a stylised 12-country empirical model where determinants and
monetary policy implications of such differences can be analysed. Each country is
modelled with a pair of simple aggregate demand and aggregate supply equations.
Each country is a small open economy where domestic prices and output are
influenced by the country-specific effective exchange rate (nominal and real). The
model is closed with a monetary policy rule. The model embodies three mechanisms
that can be important for inflation differentials in a monetary union. First, since all
countries share the same nominal interest rates, a high-inflation tends to have a lower
real interest rate, assuming the relevant inflationary expectations are, at least partly,
country-specific. Under these conditions the original inflation differentials would be
amplified through the demand side (dis-equilibrating mechanism). Second, a high-
inflation country tends to lose price competitiveness within the currency area,
something that dampens demand and output at home (re-equilibrating mechanism).
Third, stickiness in the dynamics of both inflation and output can propagate and
amplify the differentials, both in time and across countries.
We simulate the model using panel estimates of the parameters obtained from
quarterly 1998-2003 data. Under a variety of shocks, the model generates realistic
inflation differentials that are relatively persistent but return to baseline within
reasonable time spans. By varying the parameters within plausible ranges, we
determine which factors affect more strongly the size and the duration of the inflation
differences. Our results highlight the central role that inflation persistence can
perform in amplifying and perpetuating inflation and other cyclical differentials. We
also detect a significant (but less important) role for other factors, like for example
asymmetries in the monetary policy transmission mechanism or different degrees of
price flexibility and goods market integration across countries.
Finally, we consider the role of monetary policy by varying the parameters in the
monetary policy rule. We find, first, that a highly forward-looking monetary rule
tends to generate model indeterminacy, something already observed in other recent
research. Second, we find that by stabilising the average area-wide inflation rate the
central bank tends to reduce inflation differentials among countries as well.
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Five years after the launch of the euro, the inflation differences among euro area countries are
still prominent in European economic debates. After converging sharply in the 1990s, national
inflation rates started to diverge again around 1999. More recently the differentials have
closed somewhat, but on average over the five years the standard deviation of annual changes
of the harmonised CPI exceeded 1 percent
2. Several questions arise in this context. The most
obvious is what generates these rather sizeable inflation differences: monetary policy, the
most popular explanation before 1999, can no longer be the reason now. A more general issue
is how (and how quickly) these differences are reabsorbed in the absence of separate
monetary policies; in other words, how well does the adjustment mechanism in the single
currency area operate. The importance of these questions can hardly be overemphasised,
given the frequently voiced concern that heterogeneity may eventually dent the solidity of the
monetary union itself.
Differences in inflation and other cyclical variables are not unusual in large currency areas, as
we will show. Yet there are reasons why those in the euro area deserve particular attention.
First, goods and labour markets in Europe are still only partially integrated. The single market
legislation has been in place for over a decade and the single currency will help integration
further; but this takes time, and in the meantime the euro area countries will remain more
prone to different price and output developments than, for example, US States and regions
are. Second, most of the factors giving rise to such differences depend on policies largely
under national control (budgetary and tax policies; competition policies in both the wholesale
and the retail sectors; labour market regulations; and so on). There is no reason to expect that
these policies will systematically be conducted so as to smooth price or output differentials.
Thirdly, several important political economy considerations arise in the case of the euro area
and not elsewhere. Inflation is unpopular, especially if it cannot be mitigated by a weaker
exchange rate. Public opinion and politicians in high inflation countries may misinterpret its
causes and blame the currency instead
3. National differences may also make the interpretation
of euro area indicators more challenging for the ECB Governing Council, which is mandated
to set monetary policy for the area as a whole.
Some recent attempts to understand the origin of inflation differences have provided useful
insights: see section 2 for a summary. But on the whole the available analyses on this
important issue remain very limited. In this paper we try to make progress by building a
simple but empirically realistic multi-country model of the euro area and using it to
investigate the potential sources of differences in inflation and other cyclical variables. Our
approach departs from the literature, where two directions have been pursued: 1) descriptive
analyses, supported by correlation or regression results; 2) calibrated models with
microeconomic foundation, used to illustrate certain theoretical properties of currency unions
through stylised examples. Each of these lines of research alone is insufficient, we think. On
the one hand descriptive analysis has probably reached a point of diminishing returns due to
the scarcity of data. On the other, existing small micro-founded models, normally assuming
two countries only, provide only partial answers. Inflation differentials are ultimately an
empirical issue because they depend on the balance of countervailing forces, some generating
or amplifying the differentials, others pushing towards re-equilibrium. The dimension of
heterogeneity is also likely to depend on the number of countries (which are 12, not 2) and on
their economic structures (on which there is information from previous empirical work, which
                                                          
2 A standard deviation of one percent may seem small, but actually it is not, particularly if the differences are
persistent. Consider for example a union of twelve countries, six of which have an inflation rate close to the area
average, while three and three deviate upward and downward, respectively, by the same amount, so that the
overall standard deviation is one percent. If the differentials persist for five years (not an unusual pattern as we
shall see), the three high inflation countries will eventually cumulate a competitiveness loss of some 13 percent
relative to the rest of the area, and 20 percent relative to their low inflation partners.
3 Honohan and Lane (2003) stress this point.
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see our model as a step in that direction.
This paper is located somewhere between these two lines of research. Specifically, our model
includes 12 countries and is estimated in panel form with quarterly data over the most recent
period (1998-2003). Each country consists of two simple equations, an aggregate demand and
an aggregate supply. Given the scarcity of data, we check our estimation results against earlier
results in the literature, all of which use data that predate EMU. We then close the model with
a simple monetary policy rule and a random walk assumption for the euro exchange rate and
analyse the sensitivity of our simulation results to changes in key model parameters within
plausible ranges. The simulations are used to determine which parameters affect more
strongly the size and the duration of the inflation differences
4.
Our results highlight the central role that inflation persistence can perform in amplifying and
perpetuating inflation and other cyclical differentials following asymmetric shocks. A useful
insight from our model is that the main factor behind the observed differences across
countries may well be a feature that the countries have in common. We find that, for plausible
parameter values, high inflation persistence – even if equal across countries – is likely to
generate more inflation divergence than other more frequently mentioned factors, like for
example asymmetries in the transmission mechanism (Cecchetti, 1999) or in demand or
supply shocks (Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1993). We also detect a role for price flexibility
(as reflected in the slope of the Phillips curve) and goods market integration (reflected in the
strength of international trade spillovers). Monetary policy obviously lacks degrees of
freedom to control area-wide inflation and inflation differentials separately. However, we find
that minimising the deviations of area-wide inflation from its long-run level and low
differentials are complementary, each goal leading to the other as well.
The paper is organised as follows: we first review the relevant literature (section 2) and the
main stylised facts (section 3). We then present our model, discussing the parameter estimates
in light of the recent literature (section 4). Next, we present our sensitivity analyses keeping
monetary policy fixed (section 5). Finally, we look at monetary policy (section 6) and we
examine the results under alternative assumptions concerning the determination of the euro
exchange rate (section 7)
5. Section 8 concludes.
2.  Related literature
The first analysis of post-EMU data specifically focused on cross-country inflation
differentials is by Alberola (2000). His paper contains an informal overview of the data and
attempts to disentangle two forces potentially at play: 1) a convergence from initially different
price and productivity levels; 2) nation-specific cyclical factors, generating inflation
differentials because of less-than-fully integrated product and labour markets. The evidence is
sketchy, because of the very short data sample, but nonetheless suggests that both
mechanisms are present. A subsequent paper by Ortega (2003) along similar lines, with more
updated statistics, confirms this conclusion.
A more extensive review of data evidence is contained in ECB (2003). This paper surveys a
variety of measures of price and cost developments at the national level in EU-12 during the
1999-2002 period and compares them with other macroeconomic indicators. Several useful
                                                          
4 Our approach emphasises the role of shocks and propagation mechanisms in generating inflation and output
differences. Others (e.g. Sinn and Reutter, 2001) have focused instead on the convergence process from initially
different price or productivity levels. The data evidence we survey supports the view that both elements are
present. Our model can encompass also a convergence process, although we do not focus on it.
5 Throughout the paper we retain the assumption that the euro area is a “small open” economy, which does not
affect the rest of the world. Recent empirical research actually suggests that the transmission of financial shocks
between the euro area and the US may have become more symmetric after the creation of the new European
currency: see Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004). However, our focus is on intra-euro-area differentials, for which
the feedback from the rest of the world of domestic shocks is likely to be of second-order importance.
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than similar differences among US regions. Second, both cyclical and “catch-up” elements are
present, as found in the previous studies. Thirdly, inflation differentials are larger in the
services sector but are also present, with broadly similar patterns, in the tradable goods sector
and in labour costs. This suggests that national inflation differentials are not a sectoral
phenomenon, but they spread across the whole domestic cost and price chains. Fourthly,
changes in import prices (including raw materials) and in the euro exchange rate, which
impact differently across countries, also play a significant role. Finally, national inflation
differences are not explained by asymmetries in national consumption patterns; they do not, in
other words, result from different inflation rates across sectors plus a "composition effect".
This strengthens the impression that the explanation is country-specific, not sector-specific.
Honohan and Lane (2003) moved a step from description towards econometric analysis. They
estimated a multivariate panel using annual 1999-2001 data where the spreads of national
inflation rates from the area average are regressed on proxies of the catch-up effect and on
three macroeconomic variables: nominal exchange rate changes; the fiscal balance, and the
output gap. The conclusion is that "much of [inflation divergence] is attributable to the
differential impact on different member states of the weakness of the euro or international
currency markets in the early months of the union" (page 358). This conclusion however
becomes, as we shall see, less clear-cut if one adds the more recent data to their estimate; see
below section 3.
Two other papers have approached the same issue from a completely different perspective,
building micro-founded 2-country models to study certain properties of currency unions
among asymmetric countries. Both of them assume the euro area economy is closed, i.e. that
feedback from the rest of the world or the exchange rate can be disregarded.
The one that is closest in spirit to ours is that by Andres, Ortega and Vallés (2003), who,
building on work by Bergin (2003), build a 2-country model where each country produces
differentiated goods traded in monopolistic competitive markets. Price discrimination occurs
due to differentiated demand conditions and price adjustment costs: the key parameters in the
model are the elasticity of demand and the slope of the Phillips curve, both of which are
country-specific. There is no inflation persistence, only price-level stickiness. The model is
calibrated so as to mimic the characteristics of the larger and less open euro area countries.
The authors suggest that in their currency area inflation differences depend more on the
characteristics of local demand than on price inertia. Though a rigorous comparison of results
is difficult, due to the difference between the two models, we will refer to the conclusions of
this paper again when presenting our own results (section 5).
Finally Benigno (2003) uses a model similar in certain respects to the previous one (two
countries; monopolistic competition and price stickiness) to study alternative monetary policy
rules. His focus is not on the causes of the differentials, but on the welfare implications of
different monetary policy rules in presence of national asymmetries. His most important
conclusion is that better welfare properties are obtainable with "inflation targeting" rules that
assign a more-than-proportional weight to the country where prices are more sticky. This
result is confirmed by Benigno and López-Salido (2002) in a model that includes also
inflation persistence.
6
3.  Stylised facts
We describe only the main statistical facts in this section, among those directly relevant for
our analysis. Readers interested in other details should refer to ECB (2003).
First, inflation differentials among the future euro area countries declined steadily in the
1990-99 period. Figure 1 shows a clear downward trend in the unweighted standard deviation
                                                          
6 The implications of alternative monetary policy rules under divergent inflation rates in the euro area are studied
also by Monteforte and Siviero (2002).
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about 1 percent in 1999, after which it inverted its trend and started to edge up again.
Could inflation differentials have reached some sort of “natural” lower bound exactly in
1999? This idea seems supported by the comparison with the inflation divergence among the
14 US "metropolitan areas", whose data are published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. As
shown in figure 1, the inflation divergence among US cities stayed remarkably constant at
around 1 percent for many years. The analogy is probably misleading, however: US cities are
much smaller than EU nations, and their price indices tend to be more volatile. An alternative
and probably more appropriate comparison is that with the US Census regions. According to
this measure, inflation discrepancy in the US is much lower, typically around 0.5 or less. The
proper term of comparison for euro area countries should be something between US cities and
US macro regions, probably closer to the latter. An alternative comparison is with the
European regional data. Interestingly, as shown in figure 2, inflation divergence among
European regions within individual states tends to be smaller than those observed among euro
area nations, though regions are obviously smaller
7.
Another distinctive feature of euro area inflation differentials is their persistence. Table 1
shows annual deviations of national inflation rates from nation averages, for the euro area
countries and for the four US macro-regions. Remarkably, out of 12 countries now
constituting the euro area, 9 have remained on the same side relative to the area average in
each single year since 1999. In 6 out of these 9 cases, these countries had also remained on
the same side of the mean in all the preceding six years. No such striking regularity is
observed in the case of the US regions, where each region has changed side within the last 5
years. Since countries have entered EMU with significantly different initial price levels, such
a finding might not come unexpected, as this would suggest that countries with below average
price levels may experience persistently higher than average inflation until convergence. In
fact, for several countries there is a correspondence between the initial price gap (relative to
the area average) and the inflation gap in the initial years of EMU, as we will show below.
Note, however, that there are several cases where such a convergence process cannot explain
the persistence of inflation differences: i) The Dutch price level in 1999 was close to the
average price level, yet inflation in the Netherlands was above average for the last 7 years; ii)
also Irish inflation remained above average since 1998, even though Irish prices had already
been above average at the start of EMU; iii) Finland, which had the highest relative prices in
1999, experienced 4 years of above average inflation nonetheless. Hence, the persistent
differentials of table 1 cannot be explained by convergence effects alone.
 8
Going more into details, there is a positive correlation across national inflation and growth
rates over the period, as fig. 3 shows. This suggests that aggregate demand fluctuations are
likely to be a factor. Demand is far from explaining all, however, as the large residual
variance around the regression line of fig. 3 shows. Fig. 4 plots the residuals from that line
against estimates of the deviations of consumer price levels from the Law of One Price,
published by OECD (2003). There is a clear negative relation, as one would expect in the
presence of a catch-up process. This confirms that the dynamics of inflation in the initial years
of EMU was driven also by a convergence mechanism.
                                                          
7 The volatility of relative price indices is strongly affected by borders and currency arrangements, as shown by
Beck and Weber (2001).
8 The stylised facts we show here focus exclusively on consumer prices (specifically, the Harmonised Index of
Consumer Prices and its national components). Other price measures, like core inflation or producer prices,
could be used without much change in the results. The close cross-country correlation between consumer prices
and other inflation measures, including labour costs, is illustrated in ECB (2003).
9
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be considered here. First, since countries differ in their openness to international trade, any
given change in import prices (expressed in domestic currency, hence including exchange rate
changes) impacts differently on national inflation rates. Moreover, the composition of imports
differs, potentially giving rise to further asymmetries. It turns out that, indeed, euro area
inflation rates are correlated across countries with their degree of external openness and with
the changes in import prices (see ECB, 2003). Honohan and Lane (2003) have stretched this
interpretation further, arguing that the depreciation of the euro after 1999 may be the main
explanation for the euro area inflation differentials. Fig. 5, replicated from Honohan and
Lane’s paper, provides strong prima facie confirmation to this idea for the first years of EMU.
To explore this hypothesis further, we have updated Honohan and Lane's panel estimates
including another year of data (plus data revisions intervened in the meantime), and also
checked the sensitivity of their results to the exclusion of Ireland (an outlier, with very high
inflation and growth in the sample period). The results, in table 2, confirm that an exchange
rate effect exists, but its statistical significance is rather weak, particularly if one extends the
sample. Conversely, the significance of the output gap and of lagged prices (seen as a proxy
for initial deviations from PPP) is strengthened if one adds more recent data.
4.  The model
We model each national economy by means of an aggregate supply and an aggregate demand
equation. Aggregate supply is specified as a so-called “hybrid” Phillips curve, where
consumer price inflation depends on past and expected future inflation and on the domestic
output gap.
9 The lagged inflation term measures the degree of inflation persistence
10. This
equation contains also a “pass-through” mechanism, i.e. a direct effect of changes in the
nominal exchange rate on inflation. For each country, changes in the nominal effective
exchange rate depend on changes of the euro exchange rates with non euro area currencies,
weighted by the country-specific trade shares. Aggregate demand consists in an output gap
equation, function of past and expected future domestic output gaps, and a short-term real
interest rate. The lagged output gap term measures output persistence
11. The output gap also
depends on the real effective exchange rate, which measures the country’s external price
competitiveness. Real effective exchange rates are constructed from the relevant bilateral
intra- and extra-area exchange rates, weighted by the appropriate trade shares. The presence
of the real effective exchange rate term generates cross-country spillovers from domestic
inflation in our model: excess inflation in a given country generates real appreciation, leading
to deflationary tendencies that tend to eventually re-equilibrate the initial inflation
differential.
12 This mechanism plays a key role in the international adjustment mechanism
within the model, as we shall see.
                                                          
9 We disregard the possibility that these relations are sector-specific in order to keep the model tractable. For an
analysis of sector-specific effects see, e.g., Altissimo et al. (2004), who show that the differentials exist in both
the non-tradable and in the tradable sectors, though they tend to be larger in the former.
10 In a single country framework this specification can be derived in an optimising model with Calvo pricing, if
prices are not re-optimised each period and indexed to general, past, inflation. See e.g. Woodford (2003), chapter
3.3.2.
11 In a single country framework this specification can be derived in an optimising model assuming adjustment
costs in investment or “habit formation” in consumption. See e.g. Woodford (2003), chapter 5.1.
12 We opted to model the output gap dependent on the real effective exchange rate as opposed to the effective
terms of trade, for reasons of data availability. Since foreign goods are also contained in the consumption bundle
10
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could be somewhat smaller than with the effective terms of trade, unless the coefficient estimates change
accordingly.
September 2004The model can be written in linear form as follows:
j t j t j t j t t j t j t neer gap E c , 1 , , , 1 2 , 1 1 1 ,                  [1]
j t j t j t t t j t t j t j t reer E r gap E gap c gap , 2 , , 1 , 1 4 , 1 3 2 , ) (                 [2]
The index j represents a generic country; neer and reer denote the nominal and the real
effective exchange rat of each country; all other symbols are self-explanatory. The model is
written here in generic form with unrestricted   parameters, no lags except for the
persistence mechanisms, and constant terms. Some of these details will change following the
estimation of the parameters, where some restrictions will be introduced and some lags will
be allowed for based on goodness of fit (see table 3). Moreover, some parameters will be
allowed to differ across countries, as described in the sequel, in order to evaluate the effect of
such differentiation in generating inflation and output differences.
Note that, if all coefficients are equal across countries and if  1 c  equals zero, the model admits
a steady state where all inflation rates are equal, all real exchange rates are constant and all
output gaps are zero. Re-normalising all real exchange rates to unity, the “natural” real
interest rate consistent with this steady state is 

  2 c
. In general, neither the price level nor
the inflation rate are determined by [1] and [2] in steady state; for that one needs an
appropriate monetary policy rule, determining t r .
Outside the steady state, the dynamics of inflation, output and the real exchange rate for each
country is driven by a combination of factors, some of them producing and amplifying, and
some others reducing inflation and other differentials among countries. For example, excess
inflation in country j  could reduce the domestic real interest rate under a common monetary
policy if inflation expectations at the relevant horizon differ across countries. In the absence
of fully integrated goods and capital markets (i.e., if the relevant real interest rate for agents is
given by the domestic rate), it seems reasonable to assume a strong “home bias” in the
mechanism driving inflationary expectations in the national economies. In this case, the
resulting lower real interest rate would amplify the original inflation differentials.
13. Over
time, however, the real exchange rate appreciation that occurs in country j produces
deflationary effects on the domestic economy, which eventually drive inflation differentials
back to equilibrium. Note also that, if the system starts from an initial condition where the real
exchange rates are not in steady state equilibrium, a convergence process takes place during
which national inflation rates temporarily differ. Hence the model can be used to mimic the
catch-up effect of the initial years of the euro area. We will return to this issue in more detail
in Section 5.
We estimate the model on quarterly data from 1998:I to 2003:II
14, using panel instrumental
variables without fixed effects and considering the 12 national inflation equations and the 12
output equations separately
15. The scarcity of data severely limits the degree of parameter
13 See also the discussion on this issue in ECB (2003).
14 We assume that 1998 is sufficiently close to the post-EMU regime to be included in our sample.
15 We use four lags as instruments. A drawback of estimating the two blocks separately is that we assume no
covariance between domestic output and inflation; this means assuming that the domestic interactions between
supply and demand are sufficiently well represented by the explicit terms in equations [1] and [2]. To keep the
model tractable, we have furthermore decided not to include further variables, such as fiscal policy (see, e.g.,
Canova and Pappa 2003), or analyse separately country-specific and common euro area shocks. The introduction
of direct inflation and output spillovers did not change the results in any noteworthy fashion, as these effects
turned out to be of second order importance.
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full symmetry across countries except for the degree of external exposure: this is achieved by
using appropriate trade weights for the construction of reert,j in equation [2] and letting 
differ depending on external openness – in practice here we distinguish two groups,
characterised by “low” and “high” openness, and estimate the respective  coefficients: see
details in table 3. This is what we call our “benchmark” model. Next, we explore another
possible source of cross-country differences: the monetary policy transmission mechanism.
This seems the logical next aspect to examine, due to the emphasis placed by the literature on
transmission asymmetries
16. Again, we allow for two different country groups respectively
characterised by a “weak” and a “strong” interest rate channel of monetary transmission,
based on evidence by Angeloni, Kashyap and Mojon (2003), and estimate the respective
values of . Finally, we conduct sensitivity analyses around the “benchmark” model by
changing a other parameters within their estimated confidence intervals and seeing how the
simulation properties of the model are affected.
As we have seen in Figure 4, EMU has started with relatively sizeable differences in the
purchasing power price levels across countries. This is likely to imply a convergence process,
during which countries that start from below average price levels experience above average
inflation rates and vice versa. To take account of this, we have estimated three model
specifications, first by allowing for country-fixed effects, second by including the price level
differences at the start of EMU and third by entering the time path of these deviations. Since
all other parameter estimates remained virtually unchanged, we decided to use the model with
homogeneous intercepts for the remainder of this paper.
The estimates are shown in table 3 (see Appendix 1 for a description of the data used). The
table also indicates, in its right-hand side, the values of corresponding parameters obtained in
some recent papers that consider models comparable to ours.
Both the backward and forward parameters in the inflation equation ( 1   and  2  ) are
significantly positive and can be restricted to sum to unity based on standard significance
levels (at 5 percent level)
17. The point estimate of  1   (0.46) broadly matches other estimates
in the literature: Smets and Wouters (2003) obtain 0.31 in their area-wide SDGE model
estimated with 1980-1999 quarterly data with Bayesian techniques, whereas Smets (2003)
obtains 0.48 in a simple 2-equation model estimated with annual 1980-1999 data using
GMM
18. Benigno and López-Salido (2002) report estimates of  1   that differ across European
countries; they rank Germany at the lower end with 0.04, and classify Italy as the most
persistent country with an estimate of 0.55. However, note that their results are based on an
older sample period (1970-1997), characterised by larger cross-country differences in
inflation. Note that our point estimate (0.46) is surrounded by a rather large standard error
(0.21): hence other values of  1   located in the central region of the admissible [0, 1] range are
also plausible on the basis of our results.
For the slope of the Phillips curve (parameter  ) our value of 0.09 is about half of that
obtained by Smets (2003); however he uses annual data, which naturally leads to larger
estimates for this parameter. The passthrough coefficient in the inflation equation is equal to
08 . 0  , which compares with coefficients of -0.04 and –0.07 in Angeloni, Kashyap, Mojon
                                                          
16 For example, in an influential paper Cecchetti (1999) suggested that the national transmission mechanisms differ
among euro area countries due to a variety of institutional reasons. This could be a source of economic
divergence under a single monetary policy.
17 The restriction is consistent with optimising behaviour if the rate of time preference is unity; see for example
Benigno and López-Salido (2002).
18 Galí, Gertler and López-Salido (2001) obtain a lower level of persistence: between 0.04 and 0.27.
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September 2004and Terlizzese (2003a; table 2) and a range between -0.1 and -0.3 obtained by Honohan and
Lane (2003)
19.
The estimates of the backward and forward parameters in the output gap equation ( 3   and
4  ) conform less well to the theoretical priors from optimising models. We found no
evidence of forward-looking behaviour here. On the contrary, the backward-looking
coefficient is very precisely estimated at 0.51. In the spirit of remaining close to the data, we
use this purely backward looking formulation as our benchmark model, despite its lesser
theoretical appeal. We have explored the sensitivity of the results in two alternative
formulations: a pure forward-looking one and a hybrid one in which the backward- and
forward-looking coefficients are restricted to sum to one (the results are reported in a footnote
in section 5.5).
The estimates concerning monetary policy transmission seem to confirm the earlier evidence
regarding the existence of two country groups. In fact, we cannot reject in our panel the
hypothesis that in the “weak interest rate channel” group  equals zero: a result somewhat
more extreme than the one reported by Angeloni, Kashyap and Mojon (2003), who find that
the transmission mechanism works with the expected sign in all countries. In the table we also
report estimates obtained assuming a homogeneous interest rate coefficient in all countries;
the order of magnitude is comparable to that in earlier papers. Concerning, finally, the
elasticity to the real exchange rate across countries, we again assume two country groups,
based on the degree of openness to international trade, and estimate the coefficients. Signs
and relative size of the coefficient are broadly in accordance with earlier estimates reported in
the table.
5.  Sensitivity analyses
Figures 6 to 9 report the impulse responses to a variety of single-period unitary shocks in our
benchmark model.
20 The figures show profiles of inflation and output following demand and
cost-push shocks in one country (Germany in this example) or demand and cost-push shocks
of equal size in all countries. We show results for each of the 12 countries and for aggregate
area-wide inflation and output gap, as well as the cross-country dispersion of inflation and the
output gaps, measured by the simple standard deviation. We assume in all cases that monetary
policy follows a simple rule of the type  1 5 . 1   t t t E r  , i.e. the short-term interest rate reacts
to expected inflation with a coefficient greater than unity in accordance with the “Taylor
principle”, and that the exchange rate is constant.  We will analyse different monetary policy
rules and exchange rate determination mechanisms in the next sections.
Several results are worth noting. First, the model generates economically significant inflation
and output differentials. Focusing first on the idiosyncratic shocks (figures 6 and 7), we see
that the disturbance in Germany (dotted line) is transmitted to the other countries in a
heterogeneous fashion already in the initial quarters. Inflation dispersion tends to be larger
and more long-lived than output dispersion in most cases. Area-wide average effects are
generally rather short-lived. It is interesting to note that a cost-push shock in Germany
produces  both an increase in inflation (on impact) and an initial increase in output
(developing gradually). This rather unusual result depends on the real interest rate, which
declines on impact; the deflationary effect through lower German competitiveness develops
                                                          
19 Honohan and Lane (2003) calculate the passthrough after one year; this can explain why their estimates are
somewhat larger.
20 We decided to use a single-period shock, and not a persistent one, to better illustrate the properties of the model
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deflationary output effect to the rest of the area.
As one expects, common shocks affect the euro area average more than idiosyncratic shocks;
the latter, in turn, tend to generate large differentials but move the mean relatively little. The
impulse responses of the output gap to a common cost-push shock reveal that the adjustment
process in the more open economies like Ireland (dotted line in the second panels) differs
strongly from those in the other countries. Looking at area-wide average effects, common
area-wide demand shocks move inflation and output in the same direction, as expected,
whereas common cost-push shocks move them in the opposite direction
21.
In the remainder of this section we analyse the sensitivity of the results to changes in the
model parameters, focusing on inflation differentials. For this purpose, we summarise the
shape of its impulse response of inflation dispersion with two parameters: the "maximum
dispersion" (peak of the impulse response) and the "half life" (number of quarters where the
cumulated impulse response reaches one half of its final value). We still consider the same
four shocks as above (two idiosyncratic, two common). We analyse the sensitivity to
departures from our benchmark model, within equal confidence ranges (plus or minus two
times the standard deviation for each parameter), in five directions:
1)  Changes in the size of the shocks;
2)  Changes in the monetary policy transmission mechanism;
3)  Changes in the degree of inflation persistence;
4)  Changes in the slope of the Phillips curve;
5)  Changes in output persistence or the size of the external spillovers.
In tables 4 to 11 the second column reports the size of the largest characteristic root of the
system, which needs to be lower than one for stability. The shaded area in the table highlights
the "confidence region" comprised between plus or minus twice the standard error of our
estimate; and darker shading denotes the benchmark value of the parameter. The other
columns in the table show the maximum dispersion and the half-life of inflation dispersion for
each of the four shocks.
5.1 – Size of shocks
Following Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993), several authors have pointed at asymmetric
country shocks as a main potential driver of heterogeneous cycles in the euro area. In our
model, countries are subject to asymmetric demand and cost-push shocks with an estimated
covariance matrix. Increasing the size of the shocks (table 4) increases inflation dispersion but
does not change the time profile of this dispersion, as expected due to the fact that the shocks
enter linearly in our model. Idiosyncratic shocks produce more inflation dispersion than
common shocks, and cost-push shocks produce more dispersion than demand shocks, as was
already apparent from the impulse responses. The most interesting indication from this table
is that, within our estimated confidence range for the size of the shock, the variation in the
size of inflation differentials is not very large. Under a common cost-push shock, (the one that
potentially gives rise to the largest inflation differences), the standard deviation of inflation
rates changes by about 0.2 relative to the benchmark. This can be judged against the fact that
the standard deviation of inflation in the recent historical data is in the order of 1 percent.
                                                          
21In another simulation exercise, not reported here, we mimicked the convergence process starting from the pre-
EMU price levels. As shown in figure 4, such levels (as measured by OECD) diverged considerably from PPP.
Our model suggests that convergence to equilibrium should have taken place quickly and with considerable
oscillations around the steady state. On the contrary, the OECD data suggest that convergence is monotonic and
slow. A possible explanation of this puzzle is that the initial one-off price convergence process may be more
gradual than the dynamic adjustment following shocks around a steady state, since it presupposes a structural
change in the degree of product market integration. We plan to explore this issue further in future work.
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Our experiments here consist in changing the parameters of the transmission mechanism
while leaving all the other parameters in the model at their benchmark values. First, we vary
the strength of the transmission mechanism (expressed by  ) homogeneously in all countries.
Second, we differentiate the transmission parameters; we do this by progressively increasing,
from zero, the differentiation between the "weak" and the "strong" transmission countries,
following the country classification explained in section 4.
The main message coming from these results is that, within our confidence ranges, the
increase in inflation differentials following a homogeneous increase in the strength of
monetary transmission is greater than that resulting from more differentiation across
countries. A stronger monetary transmission even if equally distributed across countries tends
to generate greater inflation differentials, because with a common nominal interest rate
countries with high inflation receive a further inflationary stimulus (and vice versa), which
amplifies the initial gap. This pro-cyclical effect remains limited until one approaches the
upper part of the confidence region for the monetary transmission parameters. As   grows
further out of this region, the model tends to become dynamically unstable
22. On the other
hand, cross-country differences in the strength of the interest rate channel within the plausible
range have a more limited effect.
5.3 – Inflation persistence
We perform three experiments here. In the first (top panel) the value of the persistence
parameter is kept equal in all countries and varies within its confidence range. In the second
(middle panel), persistence is differentiated in two country groups, "high persistence" and
"low persistence"
23. In the third (lower panel) only one country is classified as having "high
persistence". Through these three examples we try to measure, respectively, the implications
of different levels of inflation persistence generalised across all countries of the monetary
union, as opposed to the effects of high persistence concentrated in a group of countries or
even only in one of them.
The results of the first experiment are remarkable because they indicate that even a small
increase in persistence from the benchmark value, well within the confidence range, can
increase inflation divergence sharply and make the system dynamically unstable. The
threshold value of  1   where unstable solutions arise is just below 0.5, against a benchmark
value of 0.46. This happens both when all  1   are equal, and when they are differentiated in
two groups (second experiment). Even when only one country is classified as persistent (third
experiment), instability arises when its persistence parameter rises just above 0.5. This
suggests that there is a critical range of values for this parameter, at which the size of inflation
differentials in the union tends to grow very sharply; this range depends on whether the
relatively high persistence occurs in one country or in several of them. We will examine this
critical region in more detail in section 6.
                                                          
22 Dynamic instability is a situation in which the number of roots outside the unit circle is higher than that of non-
predetermined variables, so that the model solution is explosive. Indeterminacy is the situation when it is lower,
so that the model has multiple solution paths.
23 Specifically, we included France, Greece, Ireland, Italy and Portugal in the "high persistence" group, following
Nicoletti, Scarpetta and Boyland (2000) who identify these countries as those with stricter product market
regulation. Admittedly, this classification is very tentative and should be refined when clearer evidence on the
relative extent of inflation persistence in euro area countries becomes available.
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We explore here both changes in the value of , keeping its value equal in all countries, and
a differentiation of  in two groups, following the same country classification used in the
previous subsection.
The results show, interestingly, that an increase in the slope of the Phillips curve, which can
be interpreted as a measure of price flexibility, tends to increase the size and the duration of
inflation differentials. Under asymmetric demand shocks this is rather intuitive: a higher 
translates these shocks directly into higher inflation differentials. Less intuitive is the fact that
this carries over to other shocks as well. The useful indication to be drawn from this result is
that more price level flexibility (higher ) tends to produce higher inflation differentials,
unless, of course, this is accompanied by lower inflation persistence (lower  1  ).
An interesting limiting case arises if  0   ; in this case, output gaps cease to have an impact
on inflation and differences in real effective exchange rates can no longer be corrected
through different inflation rates. Accordingly, price levels do not return to equilibrium, as
reflected by the fact that the maximum root equals unity. On the contrary, inflation rates do
return to baseline eventually. For high common values of  , just outside its confidence
region, the system tends to become unstable. This does not happen when   is differentiated
in two country groups. Note that the extreme case where the lower is equal to zero and the
higher one is 0.18 gives rise to indeterminacy in the model.
All in all, these examples show that cross-country differentiation of the slope of the Phillips
curve in our model tends to have a sizeable impact on inflation differentials within the
confidence range, something that echoes the result of Andres, Ortega and Vallés (2003).
However, such impact is much lower than that exercised by inflation persistence
24.
5.5 – Output persistence and international spillovers
Changing the output persistence parameter also produces larger inflation differences, but only
if the relevant parameter reaches the upper edge of its confidence range
25.
We examine the sensitivity with respect to the real exchange rate elasticity of output by both
changing the value of , keeping it equal across countries, and differentiating   in two
country groups (one of which more open to international trade
26). Note, first, that when
0   , price level differentials cease to feed back on output; as in the case noted earlier, price
levels cannot return to equilibrium after a shock (as reflected by a maximum root exactly on
                                                          
24 As we noted in section 2, Andres, Ortega and Vallés (2003) conclude that the differences in the slope of the
Phillips curve are the major factor behind euro area inflation differentials.
25 The results are somewhat sensitive to the way in which the output gap equation is specified. We have
experimented with two alternative formulations for the output gap equation, in addition to our benchmark one.
The first assumes a purely forward-looking output gap equation; with this formulation the results of the
benchmark model are broadly confirmed but somewhat weakened. Inflation persistence continues to be the most
important driver of inflation differentials, though it no longer generates explosive oscillations. A forward-
looking behaviour of output tends to stabilise the model. The second formulation for the output gap equation is a
mixed backward- and forward-looking specification, with parameters restricted to sum to unity. Here, inflation
differentials become very sensitive to the degree of output persistence within the confidence range.
26 Following Andres, Ortega and Vallés (2003), we classified all countries with a ratio of consumption of
domestically produced goods to domestic output below 0.5 as most open to trade. As they document, this is the
case for Belgium, Ireland and the Netherlands; furthermore, however, it holds also for Luxembourg.
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rates do. As the value of   rises (equally for all) above zero, inflation differentials and their
duration tends to fall; this is clearly intuitive, since cross-country spillovers via changes in
real exchange rates tend to re-equilibrate inflation differences. Country-by-country
differentiation of λ does not seem to matter much until in some countries  0   , in which
case again price levels cannot converge.
5.6 – Summary
In sum: within our confidence ranges for the parameters, small changes in inflation
persistence are capable of producing very sharp (in the limit, even unbounded) increases in
inflation differentials. Other factors (monetary transmission and its differentiation; the slope
of the Phillips curve and its differentiation; output persistence) play a significant, but less
important role.
6.  The role of monetary policy
So far we have assumed the simplest possible form of monetary policy rule:  1 5 . 1   t t t E r  .
We now extend our analysis in two directions. First, we check whether our earlier results are
sensitive to changes in the monetary policy rule. Second, we analyse how a monetary policy
geared to area-wide price stability affects inflation differentials. In looking at both questions
we are naturally interested in whether monetary policy can alter the tendency towards large
inflation differentials that arise in our model in certain regions of the parameter space.
We consider extensions of the policy rule of the form:
] )[ 1 ( 1 t y k t t t t gap E r r             ,
where measures the inertia of the nominal short-term interest rate,  y   measures the interest
rate response to the area-wide output gap, and k measures the extent to which the policy rule
is forward-looking on inflation. The rule considered earlier is a special case, with   = 0,    =
1.5,  1  k  and  y  = 0.
Table 9 shows the results of changing   and  y   while leaving k =1 and    constant at 1.5.
Our earlier results remain essentially unchanged for alternative values of  and  y   over a
wide range. Inflation differentials (size and duration) increase slightly only for very large
values of   and remain identical for all values of  y  .
More interesting are the results in table 10, where the policy horizon is extended up to three
years into the future (the two panels in this table should be compared with the benchmark
case, reported on top of table 11). Our analysis here is related to that of Batini, Levine and
Pearlman (2004), who study the performance of forward-looking rules in open economies
with floating exchange rates; they find that such rules generate indeterminacy when the
forecast horizon lengthens beyond a certain threshold. We are interested in seeing if this result
carries over to our model of the euro area. In the table we see that the benchmark results
remain essentially unchanged if k  rises from 1 to 6 quarters, but change significantly if we
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more the higher is the value of   
27.
Our next question focuses on the interaction between an aggregate area-wide inflation goal
for monetary policy and inflation differentials, when inflation persistence is present. To
approach this question we return to our simple rule  1   t t t E r    and examine the
combination of alternative degrees of persistence and policy “activism” (values of   
ranging from zero to large positive numbers), seeing what they imply for inflation
differentials as well as for aggregate inflation
28.
In table 11 we show three examples. In the first, inflation persistence (parameter  1  ) is set to
our benchmark value of 0.46 in all countries. In the second,  1   is set to zero for all countries
but one, which is set to 0.5. In the third we replicate the latter experiment but assume that
monetary policy assigns a larger weight to the country where inflation is more persistent
29.
This assumption follows in spirit the idea of Benigno (2003), recalled already in section 2,
according to which highly persistent countries should receive a higher weight in the central
bank’s decision making function.
In the first case (top panel;  1   equal for all) a high degree of monetary activism does reduce
inflation dispersion (both its size and its half-life) under common shocks, while it is not
influential under idiosyncratic shocks. This suggests that there may be complementarity
between aggregate inflation and inflation differences under common shocks, more policy
activism (in the sense defined earlier) helping on both fronts. This is the case also when
persistence is differentiated across countries (middle panel), though, as one would expect,
given the high asymmetry introduced in the model in this way the level of inflation
divergence rises dramatically. Note that when the inflation persistence parameter in one
country is set to 0.5, the system is unstable if monetary policy does not react strongly enough
to inflation (i.e.,     at 0 or 0.5). In this case, a higher     both stabilises the model and
reduces inflation differentials under common shocks. Finally, if we let the country with high
persistence receive a larger weight in the policy rule (lower panel), we get again similar
results, but the range of parameters leading to instability seems to shrink: for example, a value
of     equal to 0.5 is sufficient for stability.
Figure 10 explores this issue further, showing in the ( 1  ;    ) parameter space the regions
where instability occurs, in the different models generated by alternative assumptions about
1  . When all  1   are equal (long dashed line) the parameter space is nearly equally divided
into the stability and instability region; for  1   close to a threshold value around 0.5, the model
                                                          
27 It would be interesting to examine in the context of our model questions concerning the “optimal horizon” of
monetary policy, of the type studied by Batini and Nelson (2001) and Smets (2003) with very similar single-
country models. We leave this extension to future work.
28 Angeloni, Coenen and Smets (2003) study the performance of alternative monetary policy rules in an aggregate
area-wide model when the central bank is uncertain about the true value of inflation persistence. They find that
under uncertainty the central bank is better off assuming a high degree of inflation persistence. In principle one
could use our model to extend their analysis to a multi-country framework, considering also the implications for
inflation dispersion. We leave this to future work.
29 In our simulations, the persistent country receives a weight of 0.8; the remaining 0.2 are distributed among the
other countries according to their size.
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is unstable for all   . If one country is persistent (short dashed line), the instability region
shrinks and the boundary between the two regions becomes positively sloped: the important
implication is that, in this case, a high value of     can restore stability. The area that is
delimited by the long and short dashed lines contains the intermediate cases, where all other
countries are set to (equal or different) values of  1   below the threshold. If the persistent
country receives a higher weight (continuous gray line) the instability region shrinks
markedly. It is interesting to note that the instability region in this case is very similar to the
one arising in the case of a single country, with the same degree of inflation persistence. The
latter is shown in the figure for comparison (continuous black line).  Intuitively, if only one
country in the area has persistent inflation, the stability properties of the model tend to
coincide with those of that country taken in isolation
30.
Figure 11 shows combinations of stability of area-wide inflation and inflation differentials
that can be obtained with different values of   , in our benchmark model under common
demand and cost-push shocks. Aggregate inflation stability is measured by the integral of the
absolute deviation of the impulse response of euro area inflation from steady state; inflation
differentials are measured by the integral of the impulse response of inflation dispersion from
steady state. The value of     is allowed to range between 0 and 10; the values of 1 and 1.5
are denoted in the figure respectively by a small cross and a small circle. All lines are
positively sloped, illustrating the complementarity relation: as     increases, economic
outcomes move towards the origin, with less deviations of inflation from its long-run level
and lower inflation differentials.
31 If all countries’ inflation is equally persistent (long dashed
and continuous line) the set of attainable combinations is closer to the Y-axis than in the case
where persistence exists in one country only, as one would expect.
7.  Alternative exchange rate models
So far we have assumed that the expected exchange rate remains constant. In this section we
briefly examine the implications of two alternative exchange rate determination models, more
commonly used in theoretical work: pure Uncovered Interest Parity (UIP), and UIP
augmented by a risk premium.
Pure UIP can be written as follows:
] ) ( [ 1
*
t t t t neer neer E r r    
                                                          
30 A policy rule with weights determined according to the degree of inflation persistence is an interesting concept,
but probably not an advisable or even realistic option. First and most basically, price stickiness and inflation
persistence are hard to measure, as the controversy surrounding this issue demonstrates. Estimates that can easily
be challenged hardly constitute a good basis for practical policymaking. Second, it has been argued that price
inertia is affected by expectations and hence is probably endogenous to policy. If so, it would seem unwise to
crystallise in a policy rule national features that are endogenous to the rule itself. Such rule could even
discourage national reforms of the price formation mechanism that could eventually enhance welfare for the
whole area (Benigno and López-Salido, 2002, make this point). To better understand all these aspects one would
need a model where the price inertia mechanisms are endogenous.
31 This complementary relation is invariant to the level of the steady state inflation in our model. We are grateful to
Jürgen von Hagen for pointing this out to us.
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appreciation), and 
*
t r is a representative foreign short-term interest rate (constant in our case).
A more general version of UIP includes a time-varying risk premium:
t t t t t neer neer E r r       ] ) ( [ 1
*
Small open economy models such as ours under rational expectations and pure UIP tend to
generate indeterminate solutions; a way to restore uniqueness of equilibria is to postulate that
UIP is augmented by a debt-dependent risk premium (see Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2003). In
our model, the “augmented UIP” rule needs to pin down the exchange rate level in steady
state. In the spirit of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001) we assume that the risk premium ψt
depends on the value of the euro area residents’ net foreign asset position; the latter in turn
depends on the exchange rate. Based on information on euro area net foreign assets and their
currency denomination, we approximate ψt linearly as ψ(neert), where ψ = 0.1.
32 This means
that a unitary increase in the euro effective exchange rate implies, other things equal
(specifically, for given exchange rate expectations), an increase in the interest rate differential
of 10 basis points.
To compare the properties of our model under the two alternative exchange rate rules we first
identify the regions of the parameter space where indeterminate or explosive solutions occur;
this is done in fig. 12. For comparison we also show two limiting cases: the “closed economy”
(which assumes that no trade between the euro area and the rest of the world takes place), and
the “single economy”, where the euro area is treated as a single entity. The charts in the first
column are obtained letting the coefficient of inflation persistence vary identically in all
countries from zero to one. The next two columns show the cases where only one country is
persistent, and the policy rule is, respectively, size-weighted and re-weighted so as to assign a
higher weight (80 percent) to the persistent country. Finally, the last column shows the single
country case.
The figure provides several interesting insights. First of all, pure UIP indeed greatly increases
the area of indeterminacy, especially when the model is strongly forward-looking (low
persistence). When persistence is high, uniqueness of solutions can be restored by an active
monetary policy (high    ). The properties of the model when only one country is persistent
tend to approach those of the single country case, as intuition suggests. In this model, as
expected, “augmenting” the UIP condition with a risk premium increases the areas of the
parameter space where unique and stable solutions occur. Again there is considerable
similarity between the case where only one country is persistent and that of the single country.
Under “augmented UIP”, the “benchmark” model examined in the previous sections (marked
in the charts by the black diamond) is located close to the intersection between the
determinacy and the indeterminacy region, slightly within the latter. In this case, a slightly
lower persistence, or a slightly weight on inflation in the policy rule, are sufficient to restore
uniqueness.
                                                          
32Gross foreign financial assets held by euro area residents amounted to some 7.300 bn. euro at end-2002 (see
ECB Monthly Bulletin, April 2004, table 7.4), more or less counterbalanced by equivalent gross liabilities. We
assume that all liabilities are denominated in euro and conjecture, based on partial information, that about 80
percent of foreign assets are denominated in foreign exchange. This leads to an estimated currency mismatch in
the aggregate euro area residents’ financial portfolio of about 6.000 euro, or about 5 times the annual value of
euro area exports (goods and services). Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001, table 8) estimate that in the average of
OECD countries a unitary increase in the ratio of NFA to exports lowers the risk premium on domestic interest
rates by 100 basis points. In our case this means that a one percent euro appreciation reduces the NFA/export
ratio by 5 percent and rises the risk premium by 5 basis points.  We adjusted this estimate upward to 10 basis
points to take into account other components of wealth not included in net foreign assets.
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reported in tables 4-11 using our “augmented UIP” assumption. The results (not reported here
for brevity) suggest the following few qualifications. In general, exchange rate floating tends
to generate larger inflation differentials particularly following common shocks. It is still true
that inflation persistence amplifies inflation differentials, and generates explosive solutions
within our plausible parameter range, as was the case under constant exchange rate. However,
as one would intuitively expect, the results become much more sensitive to the monetary
policy rule. Specifically, interest rate inertia reduces inflation differentials, whereas assigning
a positive weight to the output gap tends to reduce their magnitude somewhat, while
increasing their persistence. In some cases, a more active monetary policy rule (large    )
actually increases inflation differentials and destabilises area-wide inflation, as a result of
larger exchange rate oscillations under UIP. A more extensive analysis of monetary policy
rules and exchange rate mechanisms in our model is warranted, but we see it as beyond the
scope of this paper and we leave it to future work.
8.  Conclusions
Inflation and growth divergences among euro area countries are likely to remain prominent in
European political and popular debates for a long time, and for good reasons. In the euro area
regional economic divergences are more likely to occur than in other currency areas, a
phenomenon that can only increase once the area is enlarged to new entrants.
In this paper we build a stylised empirical model of EU-12 where the determinants and the
monetary policy implications of inflation and other cyclical differences among member
countries can be analysed. Our skeleton model includes two equations for each national
economy (an aggregate demand and an aggregate supply), linked by trade, which differ across
countries only for a few well-identified factors: national economic disturbances; monetary
transmission mechanisms; degree of openness to international trade and response to external
shocks. Our main findings are twofold. First, inflation persistence, in one or more countries, is
under plausible parameter values the factor that can propagate inflation differences most.
Other explanations that have received more attention in the literature in recent years, like
country-specific shocks or differences in the monetary transmission mechanism, seem to
count less. Second, a monetary policy that is geared to minimising the deviations of average
area-wide prices from their long-run values is likely to lead also to low cross-country inflation
differentials. It is important to stress that our results are positive, not normative; our model
does not permit formal welfare analyses. The point we make is, simply, that in our model of
the euro area these two conclusions hold.
The fundamental question we leave open – is inflation persistence indeed an intrinsic
phenomenon in euro area countries? – is an empirical one. The sketchy estimates we provided
in table 3 obviously cannot do justice to this very complex and important question, on which
views are divided. Some have argued that inflation persistence is the by-product of monetary
policy regimes that are unable to anchor long-term inflationary expectations
33. If so, we
should see in the coming years dramatic drops in inflation persistence in all euro area
countries from the current levels, which as we have shown are quite consistent with the
existence of a powerful mechanism of propagation of inflation differentials. Others
34 see
persistence as a more structural and long-lasting phenomenon. A variety of empirical projects
now ongoing will hopefully provide part of the answers
35.
                                                          
33 See e.g. Levin and Piger (2004).
34 See e.g. Galí, Gertler and López-Salido (2001).
35 One is the “Inflation Persistence Network”, a team set up by the Eurosystem central banks to measure patterns
and determinants of inflation persistence in the euro area using micro, macro and survey data; see ECB website
for some more details. The group will deliver its results in 2005.
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model could be made more realistic. A more detailed multi-country model, such as the one
that the central banks of the Eurosystem are trying to build jointly in an ongoing project
36
could provide a better representation of the euro area internal adjustment mechanism. Also, as
more data become available, it will be possible to include further variables and to relax some
of the cross-country homogeneity restrictions that we have applied to our model. Second, our
model could be re-specified to include explicit micro-foundations. This would permit to
analyse, in a realistic setting, normative questions concerning monetary policy. Finally, a
model like ours could be used to analyse problems of inflation and cyclical divergence in an
enlarged euro area. All these extensions are useful directions for future work.
                                                          
36 See www.ecb.int for more information.
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September 2004Appendix 1: Data Description
  National Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (figures 1, 2, 3, 5, tables 1, 2, 3): Data source
Eurostat
  US Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) and Census Region Consumer Price Indices (figure 1,
table 1): Data source Bureau of Labor Statistics. MSAs are: Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Cleveland,
Dallas, Detroit, Houston, Los Angeles, Miami, New York, Philadelphia, San Francisco, Seattle,
Washington. Census Regions are: Midwest, West, South and Northeast
  Italian City and German Länder Consumer Price Indices (figure 2): Data source Datastream. Italian
cities are: Ancona, Aosta, Bari, Bologna, Cagliari, Campobasso, Firenze, Genova, L’Aquila,
Milano, Napoli, Venezia. German Länder are: Baden-Württemberg, Bayern, Berlin, Brandenburg,
Hessen, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Niedersachsen, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Saarland, Sachsen,
Sachsen-Anhalt, Thüringen
  Spanish Autonomous Communities Consumer Price Indices (figure 2): Data source Instituto
Nacional de Estadística. Autonomous Communities are: Andalucía, Aragón, Asturias, Baleares,
Canarias, Cantabria, Castilla y León, Castilla-La Mancha, Cataluña, Valencia, Extremadura,
Galicia, Madrid, Murcia, Navarra, País Vasco, Lo Rioja, Ceuta y Melilla
  PPP level of consumer prices (figure 4, table 2): Data source OECD Main Economic Indicators
  GDP growth, euro area countries (figure 3): Data source Eurostat ESA95 database
  US$/euro exchange rate (figure 5): Data source Datastream
  Nominal effective exchange rate (tables 2, 3): Data source IMF, IFS database
  Output gap, annual (table 2): Data source OECD Economic Outlook
  Fiscal stance: Primary Government Balance, Cyclically Adjusted, in % of potential GDP (table 2):
Data source OECD Economic Outlook
  Output gap, quarterly (table 3): Constructed using the HP-filter (=1600) from GDP data, Data
source Eurostat ESA 95 database, seasonally and working day adjusted
  Interest rates (table 3): 3 month money market rates, Data source Reuters
  Real effective exchange rate, quarterly (table 3): Real national competitiveness indicator, CPI
deflated, against the currencies of United States, Japan, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Sweden,
Denmark, Greece (excluded as from 1 January 2001), Norway, Canada, Australia, Hong Kong,
South Korea, Singapore, Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, China, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, the
Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand and
Turkey. Data source: ECB
For the simulations of the model, the real effective exchange rate of each country was modelled as
* p p e reer    , where  * p  is defined as a weighted average of foreign price levels, where the
weights are given through a set of trade linkages. For example, for a country A, the weight of
country B’s price level in  * p  is given by the share of trade (exports plus imports) of country A
with country B in country A’s total trade (exports plus imports) in 2002. The resulting trade matrix
is shown below (trade shares in %). Data source: OECD Monthly Statistics of International Trade.
%A T B E F I F R D E G R I E I T L U N L P T E S R o W
AT trade with… 1.8 0.8 4.2 36.2 0.4 0.8 7.8 0.2 2.8 0.5 2.2 42.3
BE trade with… 0.8 0.5 14.4 18.0 0.4 3.9 4.7 1.2 13.6 0.7 2.8 39.0
FI trade with… 1.1 2.6 4.4 13.0 0.6 0.9 3.5 0.1 4.2 0.5 2.1 67.0
FR trade with… 1.0 6.9 0.7 15.9 0.5 1.4 9.1 0.5 4.4 1.3 8.5 49.8
DE trade with… 4.7 5.0 1.0 10.2 0.6 1.5 6.9 0.4 7.1 1.0 3.9 57.7
GR trade with… 0.8 3.5 0.8 5.2 11.7 0.6 10.8 0.1 4.8 0.3 3.5 57.9
IE trade with… 0.4 9.7 0.7 4.7 7.0 0.3 3.2 0.1 3.5 0.4 1.9 68.1
IT trade with… 2.5 3.7 0.6 11.7 15.7 1.3 0.9 0.2 4.2 0.9 5.5 52.8
LU trade with… 1.1 24.6 0.4 17.5 25.8 0.2 0.4 3.6 4.9 0.4 2.5 18.6
NL trade with… 1.1 11.4 1.0 8.0 22.0 0.5 1.4 4.7 0.3 0.7 2.9 46.0
PT trade with… 0.7 3.6 0.4 11.0 16.4 0.3 0.7 5.7 0.2 4.3 24.8 31.9
ES trade with… 1.0 2.9 0.6 17.6 14.4 0.7 1.1 9.1 0.1 3.6 6.0 42.9
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September 2004Figure 1: Inflation dispersion in the euro area and the US, 1990-2003
Note: The chart shows the unweighted standard deviation of national inflation rates in the euro area, of
inflation rates in 14 metropolitan statistical areas and of 4 census regions in the US.














































Euro Area Spain (18 Aut. Communities) Germany (12 States) Italy (12 Cities)
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September 2004Figure 3: GDP growth and inflation, 1999-2003
Note: The chart shows average GDP growth and average HICP inflation over the five-year period
Figure 4: Deviations from law of one price in 1999 and inflation in the euro area countries
Note: The chart plots the unexplained part of average inflation in figure 3 against the deviations of
consumer price levels from the law of one price in 1999. Source: See Appendix.
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September 2004Figure 5: Exchange rate developments and inflation in the euro area, 1999-2003
Note: The chart shows the mean, median and standard deviation of national HICP inflation rates (left
axis) and the annual rate of the exchange rate change of the euro (DM before 1999) against the US
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September 2004Figure 6: Impulse responses to a demand shock in one country (Germany)
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Note: X-axis: quarters; Y-axis: percent deviations from steady state.
29
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 388
September 2004Figure 7: Impulse responses to a cost-push shock in one country (Germany)
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Note: X-axis: quarters; Y-axis: percent deviations from steady state.
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September 2004Figure 8: Impulse responses to a demand shock in all countries
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Note: X-axis: quarters; Y-axis: percent deviations from steady state.
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September 2004Figure 9: Impulse responses to a cost-push shock in all countries
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Note: X-axis: quarters; Y-axis: percent deviations from steady state.
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September 2004Figure 10: Stability and instability regions
Note: The X-axis shows alternative values of the inflation persistence parameters ( 1  ); the Y-
axis alternative values of the coefficient     in the monetary policy rule  1   t t t E r  
Figure 11: Complementarity between aggregate inflation and inflation differentials







demand shock, all countries persistent
cost-push shock, all countries persistent
demand shock, one country persistent
cost-push shock, one country persistent
Note: X-axis: integral of the impulse response of inflation dispersion; Y-axis: integral of the
absolute values of the impulse response of euro area inflation.     varies between 0 and 10; a
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September 2004Figure 12: Regions of determinacy, indeterminacy and instability
Closed economy
Monetary union, all countries persistent Monetary union, one country persistent Monetary union, one country persistent         Single country
                   and reweighted
Fixed exchange rates
Monetary union, all countries persistent Monetary union, one country persistent Monetary union, one country persistent         Single country
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UIP + risk premium
Monetary union, all countries persistent Monetary union, one country persistent Monetary union, one country persistent         Single country
                   and reweighted





































































































































































































































































































































































4Table 1: Inflation differentials with respect to the euro area/US average
Table 2: Replicating Honohan and Lane (2003)
-0.28 ** -0.17 -0.18 -0.38 -0.02
-2.71 -1.68 -1.43 -1.54 -0.31
Output gap 0.22 ** 0.27 *** 0.26 *** 0.19 0.41 ***
2.65 3.19 3.06 1.18 5.95
Fiscal stance 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.11
0.32 0.59 0.91 0.06 1.68
Lagged price level -0.03 ** -0.04 *** -0.03 *** -0.03 *** -0.04 ***
-2.88 -3.36 -3.06 -2.84 -4.03
Extending to 
2002








1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Austria -0.2 -0.1 -0.9 -0.5 -0.5 -0.3 -0.6 -0.2 -0.1 -0.6 -0.8
Belgium -0.9 -0.4 -1.3 -0.5 -0.2 -0.3 0.0 0.6 0.1 -0.7 -0.6
Finland -0.1 -1.2 -2.1 -1.2 -0.4 0.2 0.2 0.8 0.3 -0.3 -0.8
France -1.2 -1.1 -0.8 -0.2 -0.4 -0.5 -0.6 -0.3 -0.6 -0.3 0.1
Germany -0.2 -0.6 -1.3 -1.1 -0.1 -0.6 -0.5 -0.7 -0.5 -0.9 -1.0
Greece 10.0 7.4 6.4 5.6 3.8 3.4 1.0 0.8 1.3 1.6 1.4
Ireland -1.6 0.1 0.3 -0.1 -0.4 1.0 1.3 3.1 1.6 2.5 1.9
Italy 1.1 1.4 2.8 1.7 0.2 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.3 0.7
Luxembourg -3.4 -2.8 -2.6 -1.1 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 1.7 0.0 -0.2 0.5
Netherlands -1.8 -0.7 -1.2 -0.9 0.2 0.6 0.9 0.2 2.8 1.6 0.2
Portugal 2.5 2.1 1.4 0.6 0.2 1.1 1.0 0.7 2.0 1.4 1.2
Spain 1.5 1.8 2.0 1.3 0.2 0.6 1.1 1.4 0.5 1.3 1.0
North East -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 0.1 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.5
Mid West -0.1 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.4 -0.4
South 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.5 -0.3 0.0
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September 2004Table 3: Estimation results
Std Error Sign. Estimate Source Remarks
0.000 0.000 -- --
0.31 Smets & Wouters 2003
0.04-0.55 Benigno & Lopez-Salido (2002) Strong cross-country heterogeneity: lowest for Germany, highest for Italy
0.48 Smets 2003
0.04; 0.27 Gali et al. 2001
0.539 ** -- 0.026
0.087 * 0.043 0.18 Smets 2003
-0.075 ** 0.028 -0.04; -0.07 Angeloni et al. 2003a Average effect within one year
0.083 ** 0.034 -- --
0.515 *** 0.135 0.44 Smets 2003 The estimated equation contains a forward-looking component
-0.22; -0.27 Angeloni et al. 2003b Effect on output after one year
-0.3 Smets & Wouters 2003 4-quarter rate increase on consumption
-0.12; -0.19 Angeloni et al. 2003b Effect on consumption after one year
-0.34; -0.72 Angeloni et al. 2003b Effect on investment after one year
-0.06 Smets 2003 4-quarter rate increase on consumption
l -0.007 0.019
h -0.147 ** 0.063 0.045
-0.04 Smets & Wouters 2002 Effect on output after 1 year
-0.05; -0.09 Angeloni et al. 2003a Average effect of a shock to nom. eff. ex. rates on output within 1 year
-0.0029 Batini & Nelson 2001 Effect of a change in nominal exchange rates in the UK
l -0.052 ** 0.023
h -0.209 ** 0.090 0.077
Notes: The inflation equation is estimated as  t,j = c 1+ 1 t-1,j+(1- 1)E t t+1,j+ gap t-2,j+neer t,j+ 1t,j
The output gap equation is estimated as gap t,j = c 2+ 3gap t-1,j+ j(r t-1- t-1,j)+ jreer t-1,j+ 2t,j
c1
c2












*/**/*** denotes significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level respectively. The test whether 1+2=1 cannot be rejected at the 5% level with a p-value of 0.067. Sign. denotes the 
p-value of the tests for significance of (1-1) or for cross-country differences. The estimates for c2 and 3 are obtained in a model with undifferentiated coefficients. They 
remain roughly unchanged in the differentiated model. Country differentiation w.r.t. : weak transmission in Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands and 

















































































4Table 4: Model simulations: changing the size of the shock









0.10 0.955 0.02 18 0.01 19 0.05 16 0.02 18
0.30 0.955 0.05 18 0.02 19 0.15 16 0.05 18
0.60 0.955 0.10 18 0.05 19 0.29 16 0.10 18
0.80 0.955 0.14 18 0.06 19 0.39 16 0.14 18
1.00 0.955 0.17 18 0.08 19 0.49 16 0.17 18
1.10 0.955 0.19 18 0.09 19 0.54 16 0.19 18
1.30 0.955 0.23 18 0.11 19 0.63 16 0.22 18
1.60 0.955 0.28 18 0.13 19 0.78 16 0.27 18
Note: "inf" denotes explosive solutions, "ind" indeterminate ones. "max dispersion" refers to the peak response of the unweighted standard 
deviation of national inflation rates following the specified shock. "half-life" refers to the quarter in which the cumulated response of the 








shock: DE common demand shock
idiosyncratic cost-push 











-0.00 0.899 0.16 12 0.07 18 0.48 10 0.13 16
-0.03 0.915 0.16 13 0.07 18 0.48 11 0.14 16
-0.06 0.936 0.17 15 0.08 18 0.48 13 0.15 17
-0.09 0.955 0.17 18 0.08 19 0.49 16 0.17 18
-0.15 0.986 0.18 51 0.10 29 0.50 49 0.21 29
-0.17 0.995 0.21 125 0.10 80 0.50 123 0.23 78
-0.18 1.000 0.23 237 0.11 200 0.50 235 0.25 197
-0.19 1.004 inf inf inf inf inf inf inf inf










-0.09, -0.09 0.955 0.17 18 0.08 19 0.49 16 0.17 18
-0.10, -0.08 0.959 0.17 18 0.08 19 0.49 16 0.17 18
-0.12, -0.06 0.970 0.17 19 0.08 19 0.48 17 0.18 18
-0.14, -0.04 0.980 0.17 21 0.08 22 0.48 19 0.19 20
-0.15, -0.03 0.985 0.17 25 0.09 23 0.48 23 0.19 21
-0.16, -0.02 0.989 0.17 29 0.09 26 0.48 27 0.20 24
-0.17, -0.01 0.994 0.17 35 0.10 32 0.48 34 0.21 29
-0.18, -0.00 0.998 0.17 73 0.11 65 0.48 78 0.22 58
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0.00 0.966 0.04 7 0.01 18 0.28 2 0.01 17
0.20 0.956 0.07 7 0.01 15 0.34 4 0.03 14
0.25 0.952 0.08 7 0.02 15 0.36 4 0.03 13
0.35 0.937 0.11 8 0.03 14 0.42 6 0.06 12
0.45 0.942 0.17 16 0.07 17 0.48 14 0.15 16
0.46 0.955 0.17 18 0.08 19 0.49 16 0.17 18
0.47 0.968 0.18 26 0.09 21 0.49 24 0.19 20
0.50 1.008 inf inf inf inf inf inf inf inf









0.35, 0.35 0.937 0.11 8 0.03 14 0.42 6 0.06 12
0.38, 0.32 0.938 0.10 8 0.06 12 0.40 5 0.14 10
0.40, 0.30 0.939 0.09 8 0.09 12 0.39 5 0.22 10
0.42, 0.28 0.941 0.09 8 0.13 12 0.38 5 0.30 10
0.44, 0.26 0.942 0.08 8 0.16 13 0.37 5 0.39 11
0.46, 0.24 0.954 0.08 9 0.20 15 0.36 6 0.48 13
0.48, 0.22 0.980 0.07 12 0.24 19 0.35 8 0.57 18
0.50, 0.20 1.019 inf inf inf inf inf inf inf inf









0.35, 0.35 0.937 0.11 8 0.03 14 0.42 6 0.06 12
0.38, 0.32 0.941 0.10 8 0.04 12 0.40 5 0.09 10
0.40, 0.30 0.943 0.09 8 0.06 12 0.39 5 0.13 10
0.42, 0.28 0.945 0.09 8 0.08 13 0.38 5 0.18 11
0.44, 0.26 0.947 0.08 8 0.10 14 0.37 5 0.23 12
0.46, 0.24 0.949 0.08 8 0.12 16 0.36 5 0.28 14
0.48, 0.22 0.963 0.07 11 0.15 21 0.35 7 0.34 19
0.51, 0.19 1.000 0.07 227 0.24 242 0.34 222 0.46 241
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0.00 1.000 ind ind ind ind ind ind ind ind
0.02 0.927 0.04 15 0.01 21 0.50 13 0.11 20
0.04 0.931 0.08 15 0.03 19 0.50 13 0.14 18
0.09 0.955 0.17 18 0.08 19 0.49 16 0.17 18
0.14 0.974 0.26 30 0.14 20 0.48 28 0.21 20
0.18 0.987 0.34 55 0.20 34 0.48 53 0.24 33
0.22 0.999 0.50 223 0.27 179 0.48 220 0.28 175
0.24 1.005 inf inf inf inf inf inf inf inf









0.09, 0.09 0.955 0.17 18 0.08 19 0.49 16 0.17 18
0.10, 0.08 0.958 0.19 20 0.08 19 0.49 18 0.17 18
0.12, 0.06 0.965 0.22 26 0.17 19 0.48 24 0.18 19
0.14, 0.04 0.973 0.26 30 0.28 18 0.48 28 0.20 20
0.15, 0.03 0.976 0.27 33 0.33 18 0.48 31 0.22 21
0.16, 0.02 0.979 0.29 38 0.40 19 0.48 36 0.25 22
0.17, 0.01 0.983 0.30 41 0.46 19 0.48 39 0.30 23
0.18, 0.00 1.000 ind ind ind ind ind ind ind ind
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0.00 0.922 0.10 13 0.03 16 0.50 12 0.14 16
0.10 0.925 0.11 14 0.04 16 0.49 12 0.14 16
0.20 0.930 0.12 14 0.04 16 0.49 13 0.15 16
0.40 0.944 0.15 16 0.06 17 0.49 14 0.16 17
0.50 0.955 0.17 18 0.08 19 0.49 16 0.17 18
0.60 0.969 0.21 28 0.11 21 0.49 26 0.19 20
0.70 0.988 0.29 62 0.18 39 0.48 58 0.24 39
0.80 1.011 inf inf inf inf inf inf inf inf









-0.00 1.000 ind ind ind ind ind ind ind ind
-0.05 0.955 0.18 17 0.04 22 0.49 15 0.08 22
-0.08 0.948 0.16 16 0.04 21 0.48 14 0.08 20
-0.15 0.941 0.14 14 0.04 20 0.46 12 0.09 19
-0.20 0.940 0.13 14 0.05 19 0.45 12 0.10 18
-0.25 0.939 0.12 14 0.05 19 0.45 12 0.10 18
-0.30 0.940 0.12 14 0.05 19 0.44 12 0.11 17
-0.45 0.945 0.11 17 0.05 19 0.43 15 0.12 18









-0.200, -0.050 0.955 0.17 18 0.08 19 0.49 16 0.17 18
-0.210, -0.040 0.958 0.18 19 0.09 18 0.49 17 0.19 17
-0.220, -0.030 0.962 0.19 20 0.11 18 0.50 19 0.22 17
-0.225, -0.025 0.964 0.19 21 0.12 18 0.50 19 0.24 17
-0.230, -0.020 0.967 0.20 22 0.13 18 0.51 20 0.26 17
-0.235, -0.015 0.970 0.21 24 0.14 18 0.51 22 0.28 17
-0.240, -0.010 0.974 0.22 27 0.15 18 0.52 25 0.30 17
-0.250, -0.000 1.000 ind ind ind ind ind ind ind ind
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September 2004Table 9: Model simulations: sensitivity to the monetary policy rule (I): changing the inertia of
interest rates and the response to the output gap
Table 10: Model simulations: sensitivity to the monetary policy rule (II): changing the









0.00 0.955 0.17 18 0.08 19 0.49 16 0.17 18
0.30 0.955 0.17 18 0.07 18 0.49 16 0.16 17
0.40 0.955 0.17 18 0.07 18 0.49 16 0.16 17
0.60 0.973 0.17 18 0.06 18 0.49 16 0.15 17
0.70 0.981 0.17 18 0.05 18 0.49 17 0.14 17
0.80 0.988 0.17 18 0.04 18 0.49 17 0.13 17
0.90 0.995 0.17 19 0.03 18 0.49 17 0.11 17
0.95 0.997 0.17 19 0.03 18 0.49 17 0.11 17









0.00 0.955 0.17 18 0.08 19 0.49 16 0.17 18
0.50 0.955 0.17 18 0.08 18 0.49 16 0.17 18
1.00 0.955 0.17 18 0.08 18 0.49 16 0.18 18
1.50 0.955 0.17 18 0.08 18 0.49 16 0.18 17
2.00 0.955 0.17 18 0.08 18 0.49 16 0.18 17
2.50 0.955 0.17 18 0.08 18 0.49 16 0.18 17
3.00 0.955 0.17 18 0.07 18 0.49 16 0.19 17
4.00 0.955 0.17 18 0.07 18 0.49 16 0.19 17































0.00 0.962 0.17 18 0.14 28 0.49 16 0.23 27
0.50 0.964 0.17 19 0.15 24 0.49 17 0.26 23
1.00 0.959 0.17 19 0.15 22 0.49 17 0.26 21
1.50 0.955 0.17 19 0.14 20 0.49 17 0.27 19
2.00 0.955 0.17 18 0.14 19 0.49 17 0.27 18
3.00 0.955 0.17 18 0.13 18 0.49 16 0.27 17
5.00 0.977 0.17 18 0.11 18 0.49 17 0.25 17
10.00 0.990 0.17 19 0.09 19 0.49 17 0.23 19









0.00 0.962 0.17 18 0.14 28 0.49 16 0.23 27
0.50 0.987 0.17 37 0.20 58 0.49 31 0.30 55
1.00 1.018 inf inf inf inf inf inf inf inf
1.50 0.992 0.18 64 0.28 82 0.49 53 0.46 79
2.00 0.979 0.18 25 0.25 33 0.49 22 0.43 30
3.00 0.962 0.18 19 0.22 22 0.49 17 0.40 20
5.00 0.968 ind ind ind ind ind ind ind ind
10.00 0.954 ind ind ind ind ind ind ind ind
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0.00 0.962 0.17 18 0.14 28 0.49 16 0.23 27
0.50 0.955 0.17 18 0.12 21 0.49 16 0.21 20
1.00 0.955 0.17 18 0.09 20 0.49 16 0.18 18
1.50 0.955 0.17 18 0.08 19 0.49 16 0.17 18
2.00 0.955 0.17 18 0.08 18 0.49 16 0.17 17
3.00 0.961 0.17 18 0.07 18 0.49 16 0.16 17
5.00 0.980 0.17 18 0.05 18 0.49 17 0.14 17
10.00 0.991 0.17 19 0.03 18 0.49 17 0.11 18









0.00 1.006 inf inf inf inf inf inf inf inf
0.50 1.001 inf inf inf inf inf inf inf inf
1.00 0.995 0.04 76 0.23 119 0.28 66 0.47 118
1.50 0.989 0.04 33 0.20 65 0.28 25 0.47 63
2.00 0.983 0.04 22 0.19 42 0.28 13 0.47 40
3.00 0.974 0.04 16 0.17 27 0.28 8 0.46 25
5.00 0.983 0.04 14 0.15 19 0.28 6 0.45 17
10.00 0.991 0.05 12 0.12 15 0.28 5 0.43 13









0.00 1.006 inf inf inf inf inf inf inf inf
0.50 0.985 0.04 14 0.20 50 0.28 9 0.47 48
1.00 0.962 0.04 8 0.18 21 0.28 3 0.46 19
1.50 0.959 0.04 7 0.17 17 0.28 2 0.44 15
2.00 0.964 0.04 7 0.15 15 0.28 2 0.43 13
3.00 0.972 0.04 7 0.14 13 0.28 2 0.42 11
5.00 0.983 0.04 7 0.11 11 0.28 2 0.40 9
10.00 0.992 0.04 7 0.08 10 0.28 2 0.37 8
Note: see table 4. In all countries but France 1=0.0; for France, 1=0.5; the Taylor rule weighs France at 80%, the other countries at 20%, 
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